CHAPTER 26
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES OF DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY
Article 165 — Independent Electoral Authority
An Independent Electoral Authority (IEA) shall administer all national and local elections, referendums, recall procedures, and direct-democracy signature verification in accordance with the Constitution and law.
The IEA shall consist of seven (7) members: a) two (2) members elected by the Lower House by a two-thirds majority — one hundred (100) of one hundred fifty (150) deputies — from a list of candidates publicly nominated by civil society organizations through a process established by constitutional law; b) two (2) members elected by the Upper House by a two-thirds majority — fourteen (14) of twenty (20) senators — under the same nomination procedure; c) two (2) members appointed by the Judicial Council of the Republic from among persons with at least ten (10) years of professional experience in electoral, constitutional, or administrative law; d) one (1) member appointed by the Ombudsman.
Members shall serve a single non-renewable term of seven (7) years, staggered so that no more than three (3) members are replaced in any three-year period. Persons who held elected public office, party membership, or a senior government position within five (5) years of appointment are ineligible. Members may be removed only for incapacity, final criminal conviction, or a grave disciplinary violation established by a two-thirds vote of the remaining members, subject to judicial review within fourteen (14) days of the removal decision.
The IEA shall be funded directly from the state budget at a level established by constitutional law. This budget may not be reduced below the preceding year’s level in real terms without a two-thirds majority vote of the Lower House. The IEA’s budget submission shall be transmitted to Parliament without amendment by the Government. No ministry may control IEA operational expenditure.
Article 165a — Powers and Operation of the IEA
The IEA shall have power to: a) administer and certify all national and local elections, referendums, and recall votes, including the publication of all results within twenty-four (24) hours of final tabulation; b) register and deregister political parties and candidates, with reasoned decisions published within forty-eight (48) hours and subject to judicial review within fourteen (14) days; c) verify initiative and recall signatures within the timelines established by this Constitution and publish full verification reports within five (5) days of completion; d) certify or refuse to certify digital electoral and signature systems under Articles 96 and 107, with written reasons published at least sixty (60) days before any national vote in which those systems are to be used; e) enforce campaign finance rules, contribution limits, and real-time disclosure obligations under Article 70, including imposing administrative sanctions proportionate to violations; f) allocate and schedule equal broadcast time on public media to political parties during electoral periods under Article 71(3); g) refer credible evidence of criminal electoral offenses to the Prosecutor General within seven (7) days of establishing such evidence; h) issue binding decisions and publish them in full within forty-eight (48) hours of adoption.
All IEA decisions shall be subject to expedited judicial review. Courts shall decide challenges affecting elections or referendums within fifteen (15) days of filing and may issue interim orders within seventy-two (72) hours where delay would cause irreparable harm to electoral rights.
The IEA shall publish an annual report on elections and democratic processes, including statistics on party registration, complaints received and resolved, campaign finance compliance, digital system certifications, and sanctions imposed. The annual report shall be published within ninety (90) days of the end of each calendar year and submitted to Parliament.
Article 166 — Ombudsman
The Ombudsman is an independent constitutional institution for the protection of human rights and freedoms against unlawful or improper action or omission by any public authority. The Ombudsman acts in the public interest and not on behalf of any political actor.
The Ombudsman shall be appointed by a joint session of both chambers of Parliament by a two-thirds majority — one hundred (100) of one hundred fifty (150) deputies and fourteen (14) of twenty (20) senators voting jointly — from a publicly announced list of at least three (3) candidates nominated by civil society organizations, bar associations, and human rights bodies through a transparent process established by constitutional law.
The Ombudsman shall serve a single non-renewable term of seven (7) years. The Ombudsman may be removed only by a two-thirds vote of both chambers of Parliament and only on grounds of incapacity or final criminal conviction. Removal for the exercise of the constitutional mandate is prohibited.
Candidates for appointment as Ombudsman must: a) have at least fifteen (15) years of professional experience in law, human rights, or public administration; b) not be a member of a political party at the time of appointment and shall resign from any party membership before taking office; c) not have held elected office or a senior government position within five (5) years of appointment.
The Ombudsman shall be funded directly from the state budget at a level established by constitutional law, not reducible below the preceding year’s level in real terms without a two-thirds majority vote of the Lower House.
Article 166a — Powers and Enforcement of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman shall have power to: a) receive and investigate complaints from any person alleging unlawful or improper action or omission by any public authority; b) initiate investigations on the Ombudsman’s own motion where systemic violations are credibly alleged, without requiring a complaint; c) compel any public authority to produce documents, provide information, and permit inspections within fourteen (14) days of a formal written request; refusal constitutes a constitutional violation and the Ombudsman shall refer it to the Constitutional Court, which shall issue a compliance order within fifteen (15) days; d) issue public recommendations to public authorities; where a public authority fails to act on a recommendation within sixty (60) days, the Ombudsman may refer the matter to the Constitutional Court, the Prosecutor General, or both; e) initiate constitutional review before the Constitutional Court as provided by Article 90(1)(b); f) report to Parliament and the public at any time, without restriction, and without requiring governmental approval of the report’s content.
The Ombudsman shall inform each complainant of the outcome of their complaint within thirty (30) days of the investigation’s conclusion.
The Ombudsman shall publish an annual report on the state of human rights in the Republic, including: statistics on complaints received and resolved, investigations initiated, recommendations issued, compliance rates by public authority, and systemic issues identified. The report shall be submitted to Parliament and published in full within ninety (90) days of the end of each calendar year.
Public authorities shall cooperate with the Ombudsman and shall respond to recommendations with an implementation plan or written reasons for non-compliance within sixty (60) days of receiving the recommendation. Failure to respond within sixty (60) days constitutes a constitutional violation.
Article 167 — Anti-Corruption Constitutional Body
An independent Anti-Corruption Body (ACB) shall be established by constitutional law to prevent, detect, investigate, and refer for prosecution corruption in public office, public procurement, political finance, and civil administration.
The ACB shall be headed by a Director and overseen by a supervisory board: a) the Director shall be appointed by a joint session of both chambers of Parliament by a two-thirds majority — one hundred (100) of one hundred fifty (150) deputies and fourteen (14) of twenty (20) senators voting jointly — from a list of at least three (3) candidates evaluated and publicly ranked by a panel composed of the President of the Constitutional Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Ombudsman; the Director shall serve a single non-renewable term of seven (7) years and may be removed only for incapacity or final criminal conviction; b) the supervisory board shall consist of five (5) members: two (2) elected by the Lower House by absolute majority, two (2) elected by the Upper House by absolute majority, and one (1) appointed by civil society organizations through a transparent public process; board members serve a single non-renewable term of five (5) years.
No member of the security services, intelligence services, or police, and no active or recent (within five years) party member or elected official, may serve in the ACB’s investigative or directorial functions. The Director and board members shall not hold party membership and shall resign from any such membership before appointment.
The ACB shall be funded directly from the state budget at a level established by constitutional law, not reducible below the preceding year’s level in real terms without a two-thirds majority vote of the Lower House. Attempts to defund, restructure, or curtail the ACB for reasons connected to any ongoing investigation constitute a constitutional violation.
Article 167a — Powers of the Anti-Corruption Body
The ACB shall have investigative power to: a) receive complaints and initiate investigations on its own motion into corruption in public office, public procurement, civil service appointments, party finance, and all matters within its constitutional mandate; b) compel production of documents, financial records, asset information, and communications from public bodies and officials within fourteen (14) days of a formal written request; refusal constitutes a constitutional violation and shall be referred to the Constitutional Court within seven (7) days; c) request and receive bank, property, and financial records from private institutions where authorized by judicial order issued under the standards of Article 121; d) conduct covert investigative measures where authorized by judicial order; e) apply to a court for orders to freeze assets pending investigation; the court shall decide within forty-eight (48) hours of the application; f) refer evidence of criminal offenses to the Prosecutor General with a written recommendation to prosecute; the Prosecutor General shall act on the referral within sixty (60) days and shall provide written reasons if declining to prosecute, which reasons shall be published; g) issue public reports on systemic corruption risks and institutional vulnerability assessments.
No official, including the Prime Minister, may instruct the ACB to initiate, modify, or terminate any investigation. Any such instruction is void, and the person issuing it commits a constitutional violation. The ACB Director shall report directly to Parliament, not to the Government.
The ACB shall publish an annual report on its activities, including: the number of investigations initiated, referred for prosecution, and concluded; the outcomes of all prosecutions arising from ACB referrals; and any cases where the Prosecutor General declined to prosecute following a referral. The ACB shall additionally publish quarterly reports on active and concluded cases at a level of detail consistent with the rights of the accused and the integrity of ongoing investigations.
Article 168 — Cooperation and Mutual Independence
The independent constitutional bodies of democratic integrity — the Independent Electoral Authority, the Ombudsman, the Anti-Corruption Body, the supreme audit institution established under Article 163, the Data Protection Authority established under Article 15a, the Information Commissioner established under Article 17a, the Civil Service Commission established under Article 155a, and the independent media regulator established under Article 139 — shall cooperate where their mandates intersect while preserving their institutional independence from each other.
No constitutional body of democratic integrity may be subordinated to the Government, to any political party, or to any branch of government, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.
Where the mandates of two or more bodies overlap in a specific case, they shall coordinate through a formal liaison mechanism established by constitutional law. A competence dispute between two bodies shall be resolved by the Constitutional Court within thirty (30) days of referral.
Article 168a — Common Appointment and Independence Standards
All independent constitutional bodies of democratic integrity established by this Constitution shall satisfy the following minimum standards, unless this Constitution expressly provides a different rule for a specific body:
a) Appointment: members or heads shall be appointed through a multi-actor process that prevents capture by any single branch of government or political party; all nominations shall be published and a public comment period of not less than fourteen (14) days shall precede any appointment;
b) Eligibility: appointees shall not be active party members; shall not have held elected office or a senior government position within five (5) years of appointment; and shall have relevant professional qualifications established by constitutional law;
c) Term: members shall serve fixed terms of not fewer than five (5) years, with terms staggered to prevent simultaneous wholesale replacement; constitutional law shall establish whether terms are non-renewable or limited-renewable for each body;
d) Removal: members may be removed only for incapacity, final criminal conviction, or a grave disciplinary violation established through an independent procedure that includes the right to be heard and is subject to prompt judicial review; removal for the exercise of the constitutional mandate is prohibited and constitutes a constitutional violation;
e) Funding: budgets shall not be reducible below the preceding year’s level in real terms without a two-thirds majority vote of the Lower House; budget submissions shall be transmitted to Parliament without amendment by the Government; defunding or restructuring a body in connection with an ongoing investigation or proceeding is a constitutional violation;
f) Transparency: all decisions, recommendations, and annual reports shall be published within seven (7) days of issuance; all appointments, terms, and removals shall be publicly announced with written reasons within forty-eight (48) hours;
g) Judicial review: all decisions of independent constitutional bodies shall be subject to prompt judicial review; the formal independence of a body is not a ground for reducing judicial scrutiny of its decisions.
Constitutional law shall establish the specific procedures, qualifications, and additional safeguards for each body consistent with this Article.